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Disability and Employment: Reevaluating the
Evidence in Light of Reporting Errors
Brent KREIDER and John V. PEPPER
Measurement error in health and disability status has been widely accepted as a central problem in social science research. Long-standing
debates about the prevalence of disability, the role of health in labor market outcomes, and the inﬂuence of federal disability policy on
declining employment rates have all emphasized issues regarding the reliability of self-reported disability. In addition to random error,
inaccuracy in survey datasets may be produced by a host of economic, social, and psychological factors that can lead respondents to
misreport work capacity. We develop a nonparametric foundation for assessing how assumptions on the reporting error process affect
inferences on the employment gap between the disabled and nondisabled. Rather than imposing the strong assumptions required to obtain
point identiﬁcation, we derive sets of bounds that formalize the identifying power of primitive nonparametric assumptions that appear to
share broad consensus in the literature. Within this framework, we introduce a ﬁnite-sample correction for the analog estimator of the
monotone instrumental variable (MIV) bound. Our empirical results suggest that conclusions derived from conventional latent variable
reporting error models may be driven largely by ad hoc distributional and functional form restrictions. We also ﬁnd that under relatively
weak nonparametric assumptions, nonworkers appear to systematically overreport disability.
KEY WORDS: Corrupt sampling; Finite-sample bias correction; Measurement error; Monotone instrumental variable; Nonparametric
bounds.
1. INTRODUCTION
Measuring employment rates among disabled persons has
been a matter of intense concern for policy analysts, espe-
cially since the passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA) in 1990. Most studies rely on self-reported health infor-
mation to analyze relationships between employment and dis-
ability. Burkhauser, Daly, Houtenville, and Nigras (2002), for
example, made extensive use of survey questions of the general
form: “Does a health impairment limit the kind or amount of
work you can perform?” Evidence from these studies suggests
that employment rates between nondisabled and disabled per-
sons have widened substantially since the introduction of the
ADA. Yet reporting errors in disability status contaminate esti-
mates of conditional employment rates. Citing “grave concerns
about the accuracy and reliability of widely disseminated in-
formation about employment rates among people with disabili-
ties,” the National Council on Disability (NCD) (2002) warned
that disability measurement error “could lead to ineffective or
even dangerous public policy decisions.”
In this article we develop a nonparametric foundation for
assessing how different assumptions on the reporting error
process affect inferences on the employment gap between dis-
abled and nondisabled persons. Measurement error in health
status has been accepted as a central problem in social sci-
ence research (e.g., Institute of Medicine 2002; U.S. General
Accounting Ofﬁce 1997). More than 20 years ago, Anderson
and Burkhauser (1984) characterized the measurement of work
capacity in survey datasets as “the major unsettled issue in the
empirical literature on the labor supply of older workers,” and
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the debates have only intensiﬁed over time. Prominent debates
about the prevalence of disability, the role of health in labor
market decisions, and the inﬂuence of Social Security Disabil-
ity Insurance (SSDI) policy on declining labor force participa-
tion rates have all emphasized issues regarding the reliability
of self-reported disability information. Bound (1991) provided
an illuminating analyses of the econometric issues surrounding
disability reporting errors.
In particular, there is widespread concern about the ac-
curacy of self-reported disability status in survey datasets.
Whereas most studies treat self-reports of work limitation as
fully accurate, the literature encompasses a wide range of views
on reporting errors. Some researchers contend that disabil-
ity reporting is largely reliable (e.g., Stern 1989; Dwyer and
Mitchell 1999; Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser,
and Rust 2004), whereas others contend that strong economic
and psychological incentives to misreport disability, coupled
with potential difﬁculties with interpreting the survey ques-
tions, make self-reports nearly devoid of content (e.g., My-
ers 1982; Bowe 1993; Hale 2001). The psychology literature
discusses the potential medical role of “negative affectivity”
in respondents’ self-assessments of disability status (see, e.g.,
Watson and Clark 1984). The unknown reliability of proxy or
imputed responses raises further concerns (Lee, Mathiowetz,
and Tourangeau 2004).
Others take middle-ground positions by formally treating
self-reports as reliable for members of certain subpopulations
but not others. For example, many researchers have emphasized
that eligibility for disability transfers is speciﬁcally tied to di-
minishedworkcapacity.BoundandBurkhauser(1999,p.3446)
suggested the possibility that “those who apply for SSDI and
especially those who are awarded beneﬁts tend to exaggerate
the extent of their work limitations.” More generally, many
have suggested that the threshold for claiming disability may be
lower for those who ﬁnd themselves out of the labor force, ei-
ther voluntarily or involuntarily (e.g., Kerkhofs and Lindeboom
1995; O’Donnell 1998; Kreider 1999, 2000).
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Departing from the existing disability and employment liter-
ature, we do not focus on providing point estimates of the em-
ployment gap between the disabled and nondisabled. Instead,
we derive analytic bounds that allow us to assess the identify-
ing power of different assumptions on the disability reporting
error process within a unifying methodological framework. We
estimate conditional employment probabilities using informa-
tion on respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
After describing the data in Section 2, we formalize the identi-
ﬁcation problem created by arbitrary misreporting in Section 3.
New methodological results allow us to assess the sensitivity
of the identiﬁcation problem to variation in the nature and de-
gree of corruption in a regressor—namely, disability status. Our
approach is similar in spirit to that of Horowitz and Manski
(1995), who assessed the problem of identifying a marginal dis-
tribution in corrupt data. We extend their approach to allow for
corruption of a binary regressor in a conditional distribution.
In this setting, we show how the classical assumption of ex-
ogenous or “nondifferential” measurement error considered by
Aigner (1973) and Bollinger (1996) can be used to tighten the
upper bound on the employment gap.
Section 4 introduces the notion of partial veriﬁcation of re-
portswithinparticularobservedsubgroups(e.g.,workersordis-
ability beneﬁciaries). By allowing for some classiﬁcation er-
rors within partially veriﬁed subgroups, we depart from both
theparametricdisabilityliterature(e.g.,Kreider1999;McGarry
2004) and nonparametric bounds literature (e.g., Horowitz and
Manski 1998; Dominitz and Sherman 2004), which assume
fully accurate reporting within veriﬁed subgroups. Section 5
considers the identifying power of monotonicity restrictions
that link employment and disability to certain covariates, such
as age or the likelihood of being approved for disability ben-
eﬁts. Within this framework, we introduce a nonparametric
method for correcting the ﬁnite-sample bias of the analog es-
timator of Manski and Pepper’s (2000) monotone instrumen-
tal variables (MIV) bound. Under relatively weak assumptions,
our results support contentions in the literature that nonworkers
systematically overreport disability. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE DATA
Our main analysis uses data from the 1992–1993 HRS and
the 1996 SIPP. Providing detailed information about health and
disability, work history, and participation in government trans-
fer programs using a panel design, the HRS and SIPP are per-
haps the two most important data sources for studying the ef-
fects of health status and public policy on work outcomes. In
Section 5 we further check the robustness of our results using
the publicly released 5% extract from the 2000 Decennial Cen-
sus of Population.
The HRS is a nationally representative panel survey of
households whose heads were nearing retirement age (age
51–61 years) in 1992–1993. We use self-reported health and la-
bor force participation information from all 12,503 respondents
age 40 and older. We also record other characteristics, such as
gender, occupation, race, years of schooling, marital status, the
receipt of governmentassistance for a disability, whetherthe re-
sponses came from a proxy respondent, and various functional
limitations and physician-diagnosed health conditions. As part
of our identiﬁcation strategy, some of our analysis incorporates
reported health and employment information from the second
wave, which was conducted two years after the ﬁrst wave. We
also record whether the respondent died before the second wave
was conducted.
The SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal survey
covering the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population. We
use data from the ﬁrst wave of the 1996 panel, a nationally rep-
resentative sample of 36,800 households. Because respondents
older than 69 were not asked about work limitations, we restrict
the SIPP sample to the 29,807 individuals age 40–69.
Table 1 displays selected means and standard deviations. In
the HRS, 21.9% of the sample responded that an impairment
limitsorprecludespaidwork,and 66.3% reportcurrentlywork-
ing for pay. The corresponding values in the SIPP data are
18.8% and 69.5%. The differences between the two surveys
primarily reﬂect differences in the surveyed age distributions
(see the last column in Table 1).
Table 2 presents labor force participation rates by self-
assessed work limitation and age. In the HRS, the employment
rates are .294 among those reporting to be disabled and .766
for those reporting to be nondisabled. Thus the difference in
employment rates by reported disability status—the reported
employment gap—is −.472. The corresponding reported em-
ployment gap in the SIPP is −.482.
3. THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
To infer the employment gap between disabled and nondis-
abled persons, we consider what self-reports reveal about true
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations
HRS (n = 12,503) SIPP (n = 29,807)
Standard Standard Weighted
Mean deviation Mean deviation mean∗
Work-limited (self-reported) .216 .411 .188 .391 .218
Disability precludes work .094 .291 .112 .315 .135
Yes to either of the above (X = 1) .219 .414 .188 .391 .218
Labor force participant (L = 1) .663 .473 .695 .460 .686
Current receipt of disability income .101 .301 .051 .220 .066
Age 56.0 5.26 54.9 8.62 55.9
Years of schooling 12.0 3.27 12.8 3.24 12.6
High school graduate .707 .455 .827 .377 .805
College graduate .175 .380 .228 .368 .211
Nonwhite race .280 .449 .162 .382 .162
∗Weighted to match the HRS age distribution.434 Journal of the American Statistical Association, June 2007
Table 2. Conditional Employment Probabilities by Self-Reported Disability Status
Work limitation No work limitation
All (self-reported) (self-reported)
HRS SIPP HRS SIPP HRS SIPP
Age, years (n = 12,503) (n = 29,807) (n = 2,742) (n = 5,597) (n = 9,761) (n = 24,210)
40–49 .766 .838 .487 .440 .819 .896
50–54 .737 .785 .341 .368 .828 .878
55–59 .662 .670 .286 .284 .779 .792
60–64 .555 .462 .245 .185 .662 .570
65–69 .316 .257 .119 .136 .409 .305
70+ .224 .087 .287
All .663 .695 .294 .304 .766 .786
Weighted∗ .680 .290 .789
∗Weighted to match the HRS age distribution.
disability as measured by current social norms or the particu-
lar research question of interest. Clearly, survey designers have
an expectation that respondents can place questions about work
limitationinareasonablesocialcontext.Somerespondentsmay
use thresholds different than those implied by the social norms,
but the data do not reveal these respondents.
To evaluate the implications of invalid response in corrupt
data, we introduce notation that distinguishes between self-
reports and accurate reports. Let L = 1 indicate that the respon-
dent is employed, and L = 0 otherwise. Similarly, let X = 1
indicate that the respondent reports being limited in the abil-
ity to work, and let W = 1 indicate that the individual is truly
limited in the ability to work relative to social norms (or other
speciﬁed criteria). Finally, let Z indicate whether a respondent
provides accurate information, with Z = 1i fW = X and Z = 0
otherwise. We are interested in learning how the employment
rate varies by true disability status,
β = P(L = 1|W = 1)−P(L = 1|W = 0). (1)
The data reveal P(L = 1|X) but not P(L = 1|W); therefore,
β is not identiﬁed by the sampling process. To see this, we can
decompose the employment rate among truly disabled persons
as
P(L = 1|W = 1)
=




P(L = 1,X = 1)+P(L = 1,X = 0,Z = 0)
−P(L = 1,X = 1,Z = 0)
 
  
P(X = 1)+P(X = 0,Z = 0)−P(X = 1,Z = 0)
 
. (2)
The data identify the fraction who self-report disability,
P(X = 1), and the joint probability of being employed and
claiming to be disabled, P(L = 1,X = 1), but they do not re-
veal the distribution of accurate reporters. Some unknown frac-
tion of respondents, P(X = 1,Z = 0), inaccurately report be-
ing disabled (false-positives), whereas others, P(X = 0,Z = 0),
inaccurately report being nondisabled (false-negatives). In the
absence of restrictions on misreporting, the data are uninforma-
tive; we know only that the conditional employment rate lies
between 0 and 1.
3.1 Nondifferential Classiﬁcation Errors
The classical prescription used to address these identiﬁcation
problems is to assume that the reporting error process is exoge-
nous. In particular, suppose that reporting errors are indepen-
dent of the employment outcome conditional on true disability
status,
P(X = 1|W) = P(X = 1|W,L). (3)
This type of “nondifferential” classiﬁcation error has been stud-
ied by Aigner (1973) and Bollinger (1996). When the inde-
pendence assumption (3) holds, Bollinger’s theorem 1 applied
to a binary outcome can be used to show that β is bounded
away from 0 (in this case, from above) by the reported employ-
ment gap, P(L = 1|X = 1) − P(L = 1|X = 0) (<0). This inde-
pendence assumption clearly confers strong identifying power.
Using the HRS data, for example, β is estimated to be less
than −.472, reﬂecting well-known attenuation bias associated
with random measurement error.
Although the nondifferential measurement error assumption
is powerful, Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001, p. 3725)
noted that the assumption is strong and often implausible. In
our context, the assumption requires that, conditional on true
disability status, unemployed respondents are no more likely to
report being disabled than employed respondents. This assump-
tion effectively rules out, for example, the possibilities that la-
bor market outcomes affect respondents’ perceptions of their
disability status or that employment outcomes may be associ-
ated with perceived disability status in addition to true disabil-
ity status. We proceed under the premise that the assumption of
nondifferential errors (3) may not hold in this application.
3.2 Lower-Bound Accurate Reporting Rate
To characterize the identiﬁcation problem in the absence of
the nondifferential classiﬁcation errors assumption, it is useful
to consider what can be learned with a known lower bound on
the fraction of respondents that accurately report disability sta-
tus. In particular, suppose that
P(Z = 1) ≥ v, (4)
where v is an known lower bound on the accurate reporting rate.
Horowitz and Manski (1995) applied this degree assumption
when assessing the problem of identifying a marginal distribu-
tion in corrupt data.
By varying the value of v, we can effectively consider the
wide range of views characterizing the debate on inaccurate re-
porting. Those willing to assume that all reports are accurate
can set v = 1, in which case the sampling process identiﬁes theKreider and Pepper: Disability and Employment Statistics 435
conditional employment rates. Those believing that all reports
are potentially inaccurate can set v = 0, in which case the sam-
pling process is uninformative. Middle-ground positions can be
evaluated by setting v between 0 and 1.
The lower bound in (4) implies restrictions on the unknown
joint distributions in (2). In particular, if the degree of misre-
porting is no greater than some known fraction, 1 − v, then
the following sharp “degree bounds” apply (see the App. for
a proof).
Proposition 1. Let P(Z = 1) ≥ v. Then P(L = 1|W = 1) is
bounded sharply as follows:
P(L = 1,X = 1)−δ
P(X = 1)−2δ +(1−v)
≤ P(L = 1|W = 1)
≤
P(L = 1,X = 1)+γ







min{(1−v),P(L = 1,X = 1)}
if P(L = 1,X = 1)−P(L = 0,X = 1)−(1−v) ≤ 0







min{(1−v),P(L = 1,X = 0)}
if P(L = 1,X = 1)−P(L = 0,X = 1)+(1−v) ≤ 0
max{0,(1−v)−P(L = 0,X = 1)}
otherwise.
To estimate the bounds in Proposition 1, we replace the pop-
ulation probabilities with sample analogs. Bounds for P(L = 1|
W = 0) are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0 and vice
versa. An upper (lower) bound on β can be found by subtract-
ing the lower (upper) bound on P(L = 1|W = 0) from the upper
(lower) bound on P(L = 1|W = 1). Although these bounds on β
are intuitive and simple to compute, they are not sharp. In the
Appendix we show how the constraint P(Z = 1) ≥ v places fur-
ther restrictions on β and formalize sharp bounds.
Note that when the lower-bound fraction of accurate re-
porters is relatively small, the bounds on the conditional em-
ployment rates are uninformative. For example, when the
degree of misreporting can exceed the fraction of respondents
reporting to be disabled workers, (1 − v) ≥ P(L = 1,X = 1),
the lower bound on P(L = 1|W = 1) is 0. After all, despite self-
reports to the contrary, all of these respondents may be nondis-
abled. Similarly, the upper bound is 1 when (1−v) ≥ P(L = 0,
X = 1).
The striking feature of the estimates from the HRS sample is
that these bounds are uninformative across a wide range of val-
ues for v. When v = 0, the employment gap can lie anywhere
between −1 and 1. The HRS data remain uninformative unless
it is known that the accurate reporting rate exceeds .41, and the
lower bound remains at −1 unless v exceeds .82. The sign of β
is identiﬁed as negative (i.e., the data reveal that disabled per-
sons are less likely to work than nondisabled persons) only if
at least 88% of the respondents are known to provide accurate
reports. Results are similar for the SIPP data. Under weak as-
sumptions on the degree of accurate reporting, the data provide




Concerns about misreporting focus primarily on ﬁnancial
and social incentives for certain types of respondents to exag-
gerate the extent of lost work capacity. First, eligibility into
some government assistance programs (e.g., SSDI) is con-
tingent on being sufﬁciently work-impaired. In addition to
monthly cash beneﬁts, Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
beneﬁciaries are immediately eligible for Medicaid beneﬁts,
and SSDI beneﬁciaries become eligible for Medicare beneﬁts
after a 2-year waiting period. Second, some people may feel
social pressure to participate in the labor force until normal re-
tirement age unless their ability to work is impaired (see Bound
1991). Those who ﬁnd themselves out of work (or prefer not to
work) may feel more compelled to claim that a functional limi-
tation (e.g., difﬁculty climbing stairs) interferes with the ability
to work.
Short of assuming that all respondents provide accurate self-
reports, several studies have identiﬁed the true disability rate by
combining distributional restrictions with assumptions that cer-
tain types of respondents provide accurate reports. The existing
literatureprovidesanumberofrestrictions(see,e.g.,Boundand
Burkhauser 1999). Kreider (1999) and McGarry (2004), for ex-
ample, assumed that workers provide fully accurate responses,
remaining agnostic about the reports from nonworkers. In the
spirit of this literature, we evaluate what can be learned about
theconditionalemploymentratesgivenpriorinformationonthe
degree of misreporting within four observed subgroups: (a) dis-
ability beneﬁciaries (10% in the HRS), (b) respondents who
claimed no disability in the second wave of the survey despite
being out of the labor force (27%), (c) respondents who were
gainfully employed (66%), and (d) respondents who claimed
no work limitation in the current wave (78%). For the HRS and
SIPP, 94% and 93% of the respondents satisﬁed at least one of
these criteria. Although members of these groups may face lit-
tle incentive to misreport, we allow for the possibility of some
reporting errors within veriﬁed groups. Note that given the high
thresholds and restrictive screening processes used in govern-
ment disability programs, verifying a work limitation among
beneﬁciaries is not tantamount to assuming that the limitation
is sufﬁciently severe to warrant eligibility into the program.
Formally, let Y = 1 indicate that a respondent belongs to a
“veriﬁed” subgroup, with Y = 0 otherwise. At least some frac-
tion vy of the self-reports in such groups are assumed accurate:
P(Z = 1|Y = 1) ≥ vy. No other restrictions are imposed on the
error process within veriﬁed groups, and no prior information
exists for the error process in the unveriﬁed groups. Under these
assumptions, we derive the following proposition (see the App.
for a proof).
Proposition 2. Let P(Z = 1|Y = 1) ≥ vy. Then P(L = 1|
W = 1) is bounded sharply as follows:
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)−δ
P(X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 0,Y = 0)−2δ +(1−vy)P(Y = 1)
≤ P(L = 1|W = 1)
≤
 
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)+γ
 
  
P(X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)
+2γ −(1−vy)P(Y = 1)
 






min{(1−vy)P(Y = 1),P(L = 1,X = 1)}
if α ≤ 0






min{(1−vy)P(Y = 1),P(L = 1,X = 0)}
if α  ≤ 0
max{0,(1−vy)P(Y = 1)−P(L = 0,X = 1,Y = 1)}
otherwise;
α = P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)−P(L = 0,X = 1,Y = 1)
−P(L = 0,Y = 0)−(1−vy)P(Y = 1);
and
α  = P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)−P(L = 0,X = 1,Y = 1)
+P(L = 1,Y = 0)+(1−vy)P(Y = 1).
As before, bounds for P(L = 1|W = 0) are obtained by
replacing X = 1 with X = 0, and vice versa, and bounds
on β can be computed by subtracting the appropriate bound
on P(L = 1|W = 0) from the appropriate bound on P(L = 1|
W = 1). Given the veriﬁcation in Proposition 2, these bounds
on β are sharp. Using similar veriﬁcation assumptions, Kreider
and Pepper (2006) derived sharp bounds on the marginal dis-
tribution P(W = 1). Building on Propositions 1 and 2, Kreider
and Hill (2006) considered the case of a continuous outcome.
Under the assumption of fully accurate reporting within veri-
ﬁed subgroups, vy = 1, the bounds of Proposition 2 simplify. In
particular, it follows that if vy = 1, then we have the following
result:
Corollary 1. If Y = 1 ⇒ Z = 1 (full veriﬁcation), then
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)
P(X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 0,Y = 0)
≤ P(L = 1|W = 1)
≤
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)
P(X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)
. (6)
The width of these bounds depends on the joint distribu-
tion of the observed random variables, {L,X,Y}. An alternative
derivation of the result in this corollary is provided in the bound
for regressor censoring of Horowitz and Manski (1998).
Empirical results for the HRS and SIPP data are presented
in Table 3. Columns A and C provide results for the degree
bounds (Prop. 1) for selected values of v, and columns B and D
present results for the veriﬁcation bounds with vy = 1. Boot-
strapped 90% conﬁdenceintervalsaround the pointestimatesof
the bounds are computed based on the bias-corrected percentile
method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993) using 1,000 pseudosam-
ples.
As noted earlier, the estimated Proposition 1 degree bounds
are uninformative across a wide range of values for v. In con-
trast, the Proposition 2 veriﬁcation bounds are always infor-
mative for P(Y = 1)>0. Nonetheless, the sign of β remains
unidentiﬁed unless responses for all four groups are veriﬁed.
In that case, β is estimated to lie within [−.472,−.298] for the
HRS and within [−.482,−.255] for the SIPP. For both datasets,
these bounds are 39 points narrower than the corresponding de-
gree bounds.
Intuitively, the bounds widen if respondents in veriﬁed sub-
groups may misreport. Nevertheless, for a sufﬁciently large vy,
partial veriﬁcation always improves on the Proposition 1
bounds in (5). Consider, for example, the Proposition 1 bound
where v = .10, the fraction of disability beneﬁciaries. If we as-
sume partial veriﬁcation of beneﬁciaries alone, then the HRS
upper bound is improved if even 27% of beneﬁciaries are
known to provide valid responses.
The existing empirical literature assumes fully accurate self-
reports within veriﬁed groups and imposes strong structure on
the nature of reporting errors within remaining groups (e.g.,
independence between errors and outcomes). When we relax
the usual distributional and functional form restrictions and iso-
late the identifying power of the veriﬁcation assumptions, there
remains much uncertainty about true conditional employment
rates unless nearly all respondents are known to provide accu-
rate disability reports.
5. MONOTONICITY RESTRICTIONS
We next formalize the notion that the employment rate may
be known to vary monotonically with certain covariates, such
as age or the likelihood of being approved for federal disability
insurance beneﬁts. Suppose, for example, that the conditional
Table 3. Estimated Bounds and 90% Conﬁdence Intervals for the Employment Gap Under the Lower-Bound Accurate Reporting Rate
and Partial Veriﬁcation Assumptions
HRS (n = 12,503) SIPP (n = 29,807)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Veriﬁed group v Degree bounds Partial veriﬁcation v Degree bounds Partial veriﬁcation
Beneﬁciaries .101 [−1.000, 1.000] [−.976, .846] .051 [−1.000, 1.000] [−.984, .938]
[−1.000, 1.000]∗ [−.980, .854] [−1.000, 1.000] [−.986, .940]
Wave 2 .267 [−1.000, 1.000] [−.793, .703] .175 [−1.000, 1.000] [−.829, .916]
veriﬁcation [−1.000, 1.000] [−.802, .714] [−1.000, 1.000] [−.833, .920]
Workers .663 [−1.000, .448] [−.839, .361] .695 [−1.000, .396] [−.842, .323]
[−1.000, .458] [−.849, .367] [−1.000, .403] [−.848, .328]
Claim no .781 [−1.000, .387] [−.784, .361] .812 [−1.000, .344] [−.800, .323]
disability [−1.000, .396] [−.790, .368] [−1.000, .349] [−.804, .328]
All of the .938 [−.819, −.259] [−.472, −.298] .933 [−.856, −.240] [−.482, −.255]
above [−.839, −.247] [−.488, −.277] [−.862, −.232] [−.493, −.241]
∗Bootstrapped 90% conﬁdence intervals (Efron and Tibshirani 1993).Kreider and Pepper: Disability and Employment Statistics 437
employment rate is nonincreasing with age,
age1 ≤ age0 ≤ age2
 ⇒ P(L = 1|W,age2) ≤ P(L = 1|W,age0)
≤ P(L = 1|W,age1), (7)
for all age1 ≤ age0 and all age0 ≤ age2.
With corrupt data, the conditional probabilities in (7) are not
identiﬁed. However, we can bound these probabilities using the
methods described earlier. Let LB(age) and UB(age) be the
known lower and upper bounds, given the available informa-
tion on P(L = 1|W,age). Then the MIV restriction formalized
by Manski and Pepper (2000, prop. 1) implies that
sup
age2≥age0




No other restrictions are implied by the MIV assumption. These
MIV modelsare not nestedin the usualparametricmodels(e.g.,
probit models that impose different assumptions such as homo-
geneity), or vice versa.
The MIV bound on the conditional employment rate is ob-
tained using the law of total probability. If the conditional em-





















The MIV assumption alone has no identifying power, so we
combine this assumption with the previous veriﬁcation assump-
tions. In this setting, the MIV can have identifying power if ei-
ther the veriﬁcation probability or an observed conditional em-
ployment rate is not monotonic with age.
5.1 Finite-Sample Bias
Estimation of the MIV bounds is complicated by the fact
that one must impose the monotonicity restrictions in (8) over
collections of various estimates. In ﬁnite samples, estimators
that take sups and infs are systematically biased. In this set-
ting, moreover, this bias is of particular concern in that it leads
the estimated bounds to be too narrow, rather than too wide,
in ﬁnite samples. The sup of the lower bound estimates is bi-
ased upward, and the inf of the upper bound estimates is biased
downward. To date, no one has developed a correction for the
ﬁnite-sample bias of the MIV estimator, however.
To address this concern, we introduce a modiﬁed MIV esti-
mator that directly measures and accounts for this ﬁnite-sample
bias using the nonparametric bootstrap correction (see Efron
and Tibshirani 1993). To illustrate the basic idea, let Tn be
a consistent analog estimator of some unknown parameter θ
such that the bias of this estimator is bn = E(Tn) − θ.U s i n g
the bootstrap distribution of Tn, this bias can be estimated as
  b = E∗(Tn) − Tn, where E∗(·) is the expectation operator with
respect to the bootstrap distribution. A bootstrap bias-corrected
estimator then follows as Tc
n = Tn −  b = 2Tn− E∗(Tn).T h i s
bootstrap bias correction has been found to effectively reduce
ﬁnite-sample bias (in Monte Carlo simulations) and be asymp-
totically efﬁcient at higher orders in various settings (see, e.g.,
Parr 1983; Efron and Tibshirani 1993; Hahn, Kuersteiner, and
Newey 2002; Ramalho 2005).
In our setting, the ﬁnite bias is simulated from the bootstrap
distributions of the estimated Proposition 2 bounds for each
age group. To estimate these bounds using the HRS, we di-
vide the sample into 25 age groups containing 500 respondents
per group (503 in the oldest group). For the SIPP sample, each
age represents its own MIV group, with cell sizes ranging from
to 642 to 1,692 (mean, 994). Then for each cell, the veriﬁcation
bounds—which are functions of various nonparametrically es-
timable probabilities—are estimated, and the MIV restrictions
in (8) are applied. Figure 1 displays the lower bound estimate
Figure 1. Bootstrapped Age-Speciﬁc Histograms for Lower Bounds on P(L = 1|W = 1) in the HRS When Disability Status Is Veriﬁed for Workers.438 Journal of the American Statistical Association, June 2007
and bootstrap distribution of P(L = 1|W = 1) found using the
HRS sample under the assumption that workers’ responses are
valid. The bias of the MIV estimator is estimated from these
bootstrap sampling distributions.
Toclarifythemechanicsofourapproach,lettheparameterof
interest, θ, be the equation (9) lower bound on P(L = 1|W = 1)
(other cases are analogous); let LBn(j) be the estimated Propo-
sition 2 lower bound on P(L = 1|W = 1,age = j) for each age
group j = 1,...,J (see, e.g., Fig. 1); and let Tn be the MIV
lower-bound estimate across all age groups. In particular, Tn =  
jPn(j){supj ≥jLBn(j )}, where Pn(j) is the fraction of respon-
dentsinagegroup j.Thebias bn isestimatedusingthebootstrap
sampling distribution of LBn(j). The ﬁrst step is to randomly
draw with replacement from the empirical distribution to ob-
tain K independent pseudosamples of the original data. Then,
using these samples, compute a set of K lower-bound MIV esti-
matesof P(L = 1|W = 1).L e tTk
n, k = 1,...,K,b et h eK lower-





expected lower bound from the bootstrap distribution. Finally,
compute the estimated bias,  b, and the bias-corrected MIV es-
timator, Tc
n = 2Tn− E∗(Tn).
5.2 Empirical Results
Table 4 presents bias-corrected MIV bounds, conﬁdence in-
tervals, and estimated ﬁnite-sample biases for the HRS and
SIPP samples. For each of our veriﬁcation groups taken in iso-
lation, the improvements in the MIV bounds compared with the
veriﬁcation bounds are generally modest. When only workers
are veriﬁed (Fig. 1), for example, the MIV estimate of the lower
bound for β using the HRS is −.824, a small improvement
compared with the analogous veriﬁcation bound of −.839. The
improvement from the age MIV is somewhat larger for the
SIPP, with the lower bound improving by 5 percentage points,
from −.842 to −.794. Also note that in the case where workers
are veriﬁed, the ﬁnite-sample bias plays only a modest role in
both the HRS and SIPP samples. In the HRS, the bias is esti-
mated to be 1.4 percentage points. Reﬂecting the larger sample
Table 4. Estimated Bounds and 90% Conﬁdence Intervals for the
Employment Gap Under the Age MIV Assumption
Veriﬁed group HRS (n = 12,503) SIPP (n = 29,807)
Beneﬁciaries [−.971, .831]a [−.974, .915]
[−.977, .842]b [−.980, .921]
+.013 −.022c +.007 −.007
Wave 2 veriﬁcation [−.762, .672] [−.805, .881]
[−.775, .686] [−.815, .887]
+.021 −.027 +.012 −.012
Workers [−.824, .357] [−.794, .322]
[−.838, .366] [−.807, .327]
+.014 −.008 +.010 −.004
Claim no disability [−.767, .357] [−.785, .322]
[−.780, .367] [−.791, .327]
+.006 −.008 +.004 −.004
All of the above [−.431, −.308] [−.438, −.255]
[−.449, −.281] [−.441, −.241]
+.029 −.033 +.025 −.023
NOTE: For the HRS, each age group is constructed with 500 observations per age cell (503 for
the oldest group); for the SIPP, each age represents its own MIV group, with cell sizes ranging
from to 642 to 1,692 (mean, 994).
aMIV point estimates, corrected for ﬁnite-sample bias.
bBootstrapped 90% conﬁdence intervals.
cEstimated ﬁnite-sample bias.
sizes, the bias in the SIPP is estimated to be 1.0 percentage
point.
A more striking result emerges for the case when respon-
dents within all four veriﬁcation groups are assumed to provide
accurate reports. In this case the estimated MIV bounds for the
true employment gap estimated from the HRS do not contain
the self-reported employment gap, −.472, and the 90% conﬁ-
dence intervals do not overlap. A similar result holds for the
SIPP as the conﬁdence interval lower bound, −.441, exceeds
the self-reported value of β, −.482. This ﬁnding was also con-
ﬁrmed using the publicly released 5% extract of 3,806,011 indi-
viduals age 40–69 from the 1990 decennial Census (even with-
out longitudinal information that might verify some self-reports
based on responses from a subsequent wave). About 15.2% of
the Census respondents reported being limited in the ability to
work. The 90% conﬁdence interval lower bound for β is −.411,
which exceeds the self-reported value of −.474. With age cell
sizes averaging nearly 130,000 observations in the Census, the
estimated ﬁnite-sample bias for the standard MIV lower-bound
estimator is negligible, <.001. In contrast, the estimated bias is
2.9 percentage points in the HRS and 2.5 percentage points in
the SIPP.
Thus, if employment weakly decreases with age, then these
ﬁndings suggest that conventional models that presume valid
self-reports are likely to be misspeciﬁed. Because the unver-
iﬁed group comprises nonworkers who claim to be disabled,
theseﬁndingssupportconcernsintheliteraturethatmembersof
this group may systematically overreport disability. Also note
thatthisﬁndingisinconsistentwiththenondifferentialindepen-
dence assumption, P(X = 1|W) = P(X = 1|W,L), discussed in
Section 3.1.
To further assess the sensitivity of this ﬁnding, we applied
two other MIV assumptions in the HRS sample. First, we
treated age as an MIV in disability instead of in employment.
Second, instead of age, a natural MIV that exploits information
from various individual characteristics in the HRS data can be
constructed as the outcome of a respondent’s disability insur-
ance application decision. In particular, we let the categorical
variable A equal 0 if the respondent has not applied for disabil-
ity beneﬁts, 1 if a disability application was rejected, 2 if an
application was accepted after appeal, and 3 if an application
was accepted immediately. Using A as the dependent variable,
we constructed an MIV as ﬁtted values from an ordered probit
model of the application outcome. The speciﬁcation includes
indicators for a large set of physician-diagnosed health condi-
tions and activities of daily living limitations, an indicator for
subsequentmortality(diedbeforewave2),anindicatorforideal
body mass, age, education, race, gender, marital status, veteran
status, and asset level. (Details from this regression are avail-
able on request.) We deﬁne the ideal range to be 20–25 kg/m2,
following Fahey, Insel, and Roth (1997). In both of these cases,
we ﬁnd that the lower-bound MIV estimator exceeds the self-
reported employment gap. For example, given full veriﬁcation
within the previously discussed subgroups, the 90% conﬁdence
interval for β narrows to [−.443,−.289] after the disability ap-
plication MIV is imposed (500 observations per cell).
Consistent with the literature, we have maintained the as-
sumption that all veriﬁed respondents provide accurate reports
of disability status. Although these veriﬁed subgroups may notKreider and Pepper: Disability and Employment Statistics 439
have economic or social incentives to systematically misre-
port, some inaccurate responses may still exist; respondents
may have difﬁculties in answering subjective questions, valid
reports can be miscoded, and so forth. Proxy reports among
veriﬁed groups may be of particular concern. Conceptual difﬁ-
culties in answering questions about disability status may be
compounded for respondents answering on behalf of others.
Nonetheless, although proxy respondents may have less infor-
mation about the extent of an impairment or its changing dy-
namics, they also may have less incentive to misreport. Lee
et al. (2004) compared estimates of the number of disabled
persons by respondent type in an environment in which self-
response versus proxy was randomized. Among their primary
ﬁndings, self-respondents and proxy respondents were equally
likely to report disability during the initial interview, but proxy
respondents were less likely to report disability in the second
wave of the survey. The type of proxy mattered; spouses tended
to give more consistent responses. This consistency could sig-
nify less misreporting among spouse proxies or that misreport-
ing among individuals tends to spill over to the spouse’s re-
port. In our HRS sample, <5% of the responses came from
proxy respondents; of those cases, the vast majority (>90%)
were spouses. In our SIPP sample, nearly 30% of the responses
came from proxies (of undocumented type).
We examined the sensitivity of our results to varying degrees
of misreporting among proxies within the four veriﬁed groups.
Speciﬁcally, we let P(Z = 1|Y = 1,proxy = 1) ≥ v 
y. When
v 
y = 1, all proxy reports within the veriﬁed groups are known to
be accurate. When v 
y = 0, all proxy reports may be inaccurate.
For the HRS, the 90% conﬁdence interval for β expands from
[−.449,−.281] when v 
y = 1t o[−.470,−.255] when v 
y = 0,
a4 .7-percentage point increase in the widths of the bounds. The
conﬁdence interval for the SIPP expands from [−.441,−.241]
to [−.583,−.105], a 28-percentage point increase in the width.
Our earlier conclusion that the 90% conﬁdence interval does
not contain the self-reported value of β still holds in the HRS
even if all of the proxy reports may be inaccurate. The conclu-
sion still holds in the SIPP if v 
y exceeds .75.
More generally, using Proposition 2, we can allow for the
possibility of reporting errors from other sources within veri-
ﬁed groups. For P(Z = 1|Y = 1) ≥ vy and arbitrary reporting
errors, the 90% conﬁdence interval does not contain the self-
reported value of β if vy exceeds .95 in the HRS and .92 in
the SIPP. These critical values fall substantially, however, if in-
valid response among the veriﬁed can be treated as random er-
ror attributable to difﬁculties in answering subjective questions,
coding mistakes, and so forth. In particular, suppose
P(W = 1|Y = 1) = P(W = 1|Y = 1,Z). (10)
When all four subgroups are veriﬁed, the bias-corrected MIV
bounds do not contain the self-report of the employment gap, β,
as long as invalid response within each observed veriﬁed sub-
group does not exceed about 15% in the HRS (vy = .85) or
about 30% in the SIPP (vy = .70). Using the disability appli-
cation index MIV, the conﬁdence interval does not contain the
self-reported value of β unless more than about 25% (vy = .75)
of respondents in the veriﬁed groups may misreport.
In summary, evidence that some types of respondents sys-
tematically overreport disability is replicated across different
data and MIV assumptions and is robust to departures from the
assumption of fully accurate reporting within veriﬁed groups.
6. CONCLUSION
Concerns over the validity of self-reported disability mea-
sures have been central in the many debates about the labor
market outcomes of older persons. Given arbitrary errors in dis-
ability reporting, there is a critical and long-standing gap in our
knowledge about how different data and assumptions affect in-
ferences. The Institute of Medicine (2002) has highlighted the
lack of information on reporting errors and called for more re-
search into the nature and consequences of these errors. The
usual approach has been to identify parameters of interest by
imposing strong distributional and functional form assumptions
on the nature of misreporting. Most studies assume fully accu-
rate reporting, but others have modeled the nature of misreport-
ing in the context of conventional latent variable models.
We have developed and applied a unifying nonparametric
methodology that allows us to assess the power of different as-
sumptions about the error process in self-reported measures of
work limitation when inferring the employment gap between
the nondisabled and disabled. We began by extending Horowitz
and Manski’s (1995) univariate setting to the case of a corrupt
variable in a conditional distribution. We then examined the
identifying power of “partial veriﬁcation” and monotonicity re-
strictions on reporting errors. Within this framework, we intro-
duced a method for correcting the ﬁnite-sample bias in Manski
and Pepper’s (2000) MIV estimator.
Althoughourapproachcannotresolvedecadesofuncertainty
tied to disability reporting errors, our analysis takes an impor-
tant step in formalizing the identiﬁcation problem and high-
lighting the identifying power of various primitive assumptions.
Much of our analysis reveals the uncertainty created by arbi-
trary reporting errors. When we isolate the identifying power
of popular veriﬁcation assumptions without the usual distribu-
tional restrictions, much uncertainty about the true conditional
employment rates often remains. This important negative result
supports concerns that conclusions derived from conventional
latent variablemodelsmaybe driven largelyby ad hocparamet-
ric restrictions. Moreover, some of the estimated bounds under
the MIV restrictions do not include the employment gap based
on self-reported data, thus casting doubt on the validity of treat-
ing self-reports as fully accurate.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2
Proof of Proposition 1 (Degree Bounds): P(Z = 1) ≥ v
Decompose the conditional probability in (2) as
P(L = 1|W = 1) =
 
P(L = 1,X = 1)+a−b
 
  
P(X = 1)+P(L = 0,X = 0,Z = 0)
−P(L = 0,X = 1,Z = 0)+a−b
 
,
where a ≡ P(L = 1,X = 0,Z = 0) with 0 ≤ a ≤ min[(1 − v),
P(L = 1,X = 0)] and b ≡ P(L = 1,X = 1,Z = 0) with 0 ≤ b ≤
min[(1−v),P(L = 1,X = 1)]. Then, for conjectured values of a and b,
it follows that
P(L = 1,X = 1)−b
P(X = 1)−b+min{(1−v)−b,P(L = 0,X = 0)}
≤ P(L = 1|W = 1)
≤
P(L = 1,X = 1)+a
P(X = 1)+a−min{(1−v)−a,P(L = 0,X = 1)}
. (A.1)440 Journal of the American Statistical Association, June 2007
These bounds are identiﬁed by ﬁnding the values of {a,b} that maxi-
mize the upper bound and minimize the lower bound. First, note that
these extrema are realized only if (1 − v) − b ≤ P(L = 0,X = 0) and
(1−v)−a ≤ P(L = 0,X = 1), in which case (A.1) simpliﬁes to
P(L = 1,X = 1)−b
P(X = 1)−2b+(1−v)
≤ P(L = 1|W = 1)
≤
P(L = 1,X = 1)+a
P(X = 1)+2a−(1−v)
. (A.2)
Differentiating this bound with respect to a and b reveals that the lower
bound is minimized when b = δ and the upper bound is maximized
when a = γ. Proposition 1 follows.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Partial Veriﬁcation): P(Z = 1|Y = 1) ≥ vy
The employment rate among disabled persons is given by P(L = 1|
W = 1) = P(L=1,W=1)
P(W=1) . Decompose the numerator as
P(L = 1,W = 1) = P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,W = 1,Y = 0)
+P(L = 1,X = 0,Y = 1,Z = 0)
−P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1,Z = 0),
and decompose the denominator as
P(W = 1) = P(X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,W = 1,Y = 0)
+P(L = 0,W = 1,Y = 0)
+P(L = 1,X = 0,Y = 1,Z = 0)
+P(L = 0,X = 0,Y = 1,Z = 0)
−P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1,Z = 0)
−P(L = 0,X = 1,Y = 1,Z = 0).
Let b = P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1,Z = 0),w h e r e0≤ b ≤ min[(1−vy)×
P(y = 1),P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)],a n dl e ta = P(L = 1,X = 0,
Y = 1,Z = 0),w h e r e0≤ a ≤ min[(1 − vy)P(Y = 1),P(L = 1,X = 0,
Y = 1)]. Then, for conjectured values of a and b, it follows that
 
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)−b
 
  
P(X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 0,Y = 0)−b
+min{(1−vy)P(Y = 1)−b,P(L = 0,X = 0,Y = 1)}
 
≤ P(L = 1|W = 1)
≤
 
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)+a
 
  
P(X = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)+a




Because a and b are unknown parameters, these bounds are not
identiﬁed. Bounds are identiﬁed by ﬁnding the values of {a,b} that
maximize the upper bound and minimize the lower bound. First, note
that these extrema are realized only if (1−vy)P(Y = 1)−b ≤ P(L = 0,
X = 0,Y = 1) and (1 − vy)P(Y = 1) − a ≤ P(L = 0,X = 1,Y = 1),i n
which case (A.3) simpliﬁes to
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)−b
P(X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 0,Y = 0)−2b+(1−vy)P(Y = 1)
≤ P(L = 1|W = 1)
≤
P(L = 1,X = 1,Y = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)+a
P(X = 1)+P(L = 1,Y = 0)+2a−(1−vy)P(Y = 1)
. (A.4)
Differentiating this bound with respect to a and b reveals that the lower
bound is minimized when b = δ and the upper bound is maximized
when a = γ. Proposition 2 follows.
Sharp Degree Bounds on β
Suppose that one has prior information on the maximum degree of
inaccurate responses, P(Z = 1) ≥ v. Using the same logic as in Propo-
sition 1, we can also bound P(L = 1|W = 0),
P(L = 1,X = 0)−a
P(X = 0)−2a+(1−v)
≤ P(L = 1|W = 0)
≤
P(L = 1,X = 0)+b
P(X = 1)+2b−(1−v)
. (A.5)
Combining (A.1) and (A.5), we have the following result:




P(L = 1,X = 1)−b
P(X = 1)−2b+(1−v)
−







P(L = 1,X = 1)+a
P(X = 1)+2a−(1−v)
−





Over part of the range for v, these bounds differ from the naive
bounds obtained directly from Proposition 1. Consider, for example,
the lower bound in Proposition A.1. If the value of the unknown pa-
rameter b that minimizes the ﬁrst expression [i.e., the lower bound on
P(L = 1|W = 1)] differs from the value of b that maximizes the sec-
ond expression [i.e., the upper bound on P(L = 1|W = 0)], then the
two bounds on β will differ, and the Proposition A.1 bounds will be
tighter. The two bounds will be identical when the lower bound on
P(L = 1|W = 1) and the upper bound on P(L = 1|W = 0) are realized
at same value of the unknown parameter b.
[Received November 2004. Revised December 2005.]
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